Giving reconciliation a chance in Sudan seeking an alternative response to the Darfur conflict by Birech, Robert T.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2009-12
Giving reconciliation a chance in Sudan seeking an
alternative response to the Darfur conflict
Birech, Robert T.












Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
GIVING RECONCILIATION A CHANCE IN SUDAN: 









 Thesis Advisor:   Anna Simons 
 Second Reader: Mark Berger 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
December 2009 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE   
Giving Reconciliation a Chance: Seeking An Alternative Response to Darfur Crisis  
6. AUTHOR(S)  Maj Robert T. Birech 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
In the Darfur region of Sudan, violent conflict between the Government of Sudan—supported by the 
Janjaweed militias drawn from the Arab community, and the rebel groups drawn predominantly from the three 
African tribes (the Fur, Massalit and Zaghawa)—has been depicted largely as an Arab–African war. This conflict has 
witnessed massive displacements of population (with 2.7 million Internally Displaced Persons and approximately 
250,000 living as refugees in Chad), destruction of property, and continued suffering despite the signing of the Darfur 
Peace Agreement in 2006.  
This thesis explores the origins of this conflict, and describes the factors that prolong it. Using Darfur as a 
case study, it promotes a conflict resolution mechanism based on traditional conflict resolution methods intended to 
facilitate the rebuilding of trust and consensus needed for renewed coexistence among Darfurians. While not 
dismissing the need for justice and punishment for those responsible or involved in crimes against humanity 
(genocide and war crimes), any resolution of the crisis must also provide a way for local-level reconciliation to occur 
so that displaced people can return home. Otherwise, their continued absence is bound to complicate the peace 
process with the passage of time.   
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
71 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  
 
Sudan, Darfur, conflict resolution, reconciliation, Native administration system and Judiyya.   

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
GIVING RECONCILIATION A CHANCE IN SUDAN:  
SEEKING AN ALTERNATIVE RESPONSE TO THE DARFUR CONFLICT 
 
Robert T. Birech 
Major, Kenya Navy 
B.Ed (Sc), Moi University, 1996 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 

























Gordon McCormick  
Chairman, Department of Defense Analysis 
 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
In the Darfur region of Sudan, violent conflict between the Government of 
Sudan—supported by the Janjaweed militias drawn from the Arab community, and the 
rebel groups drawn predominantly from the three African tribes (the Fur, Massalit and 
Zaghawa)—has been depicted largely as an Arab–African war. This conflict has 
witnessed massive displacements of population (with 2.7 million Internally Displaced 
Persons and approximately 250,000 living as refugees in Chad), destruction of property, 
and continued suffering despite the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in 2006.  
This thesis explores the origins of this conflict, and describes the factors that 
prolong it. Using Darfur as a case study, it promotes a conflict resolution mechanism 
based on traditional conflict resolution methods intended to facilitate the rebuilding of 
trust and consensus needed for renewed coexistence among Darfurians. While not 
dismissing the need for justice and punishment for those responsible or involved in 
crimes against humanity (genocide and war crimes), any resolution of the crisis must also 
provide a way for local-level reconciliation to occur so that displaced people can return 
home. Otherwise, their continued absence is bound to further complicate the peace 
process with the passage of time.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
The history of Sudan is a history of continued conflict since it attained its 
independence from the Anglo–Egyptian condominium in 1956. The two key variables for 
human development—peace and security—have eluded Sudan, making life a harsh and 
brutish affair for many of the Sudanese who are either living as internally displaced 
persons or as refugees. Sudan, the largest country on the African continent, borders nine 
other countries: Libya and Egypt in the North; Ethiopia and Eritrea to the East; Kenya, 
Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo to the south, and the Central Africa 
Republic and Chad to the west. With this vast territorial expanse of nearly one million 
square miles straddling the Arabic north and southern black Africa and a diverse mix of 
culture, geography and ecological setup, Sudan no doubt faces significant challenges to 
achieving anything resembling peace and security as a modern nation-state (Woodward, 
1979).  
The face that Sudan presents to the outside world is one that is culturally Arab 
and religiously Muslim, having joined the Arab League at independence. Internally, 
however, the country is much more complex, exhibiting sharp cleavages that run along 
ethnic, racial, tribal, geographic and religious lines. While the Nile valley is 
predominantly occupied by Arab tribes, the East is home to the pastoral Beja tribe who 
trace their ancestry to the Nubians, the ancient peoples of the Nile. The Western region, 
Darfur, though entirely Muslim, is ethnically and racially mixed courtesy of a history of 
migration and commercial interaction over many centuries. In the south, animist and 
Christian communities have their own distinctive traditional tribal structures.  
The latest conflict in Darfur, the western region of the Sudan, continues despite 
the signing on 05 May 2006 of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in Abuja, Nigeria. 




when reports started seeping out about the atrocities that confused the world that was 
used to hearing about the north-south conflict, popularly explained as a clash between the 
Muslim north and the Christian south.  
Now in its seventh year since it first attracted international attention, the conflict 
in Darfur has caused untold suffering to the people there, approximately 250,000 of 
whom are refugees in Chad, while over 2.7 million remain internally displaced, surviving 
on food aid from various Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Regional and 
international efforts to mediate the conflict have achieved minimal success due, in part, to 
the proliferation of rebel groups complicating the peace process, and to some extent the 
Khartoum government’s lack of commitment to implementing its end of the bargain. 
Following the Rwandan genocide in 1994, which shocked the world, many 
declarations were made ranging from the “not on my watch” comment by American 
President George Bush to the passing of the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) Protocol by 
the United Nation (UN) during the 2005 World Summit (UN Report, 2005). Barely a 
decade down the line since the Rwandan genocide, observers of the events taking place in 
Darfur began reporting instances of genocide or ethnic cleansing in progress.  The 
bloodshed in Darfur started in 2003, when two armed rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation 
Army/Movement (SLA/M), and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) attacked 
Sudanese government installations (SudanNews, June 2005). The emergence of these 
rebel groups was a culmination of the desire of the Darfur people to end the region’s 
endemic economic and political marginalization.  The rebel groups are from the three 
main non-Arab tribes: the Fur and Massalit (sedentary farmers), and Zaghawa (cattle 
herding nomads). Periodic tensions between the ethnic groups in Darfur can be traced to 
1930s, and most recently surfaced in the 1980s (Dagne, 2006, February 26), when 
drought and famine ravaged the region, increasing the competition for land and water 
points. 
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Map of Sudan 
 
Figure 1.   Sudan Map  
Retrieved July 2009, from http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/sudan.pdf 
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The conflict in Darfur has local, national, regional and international 
repercussions. The effects of the conflict have spilled over to Chad and the Central Africa 
Republic (CAR), straining tensions with these countries that are struggling to contain 
their own insurgent groups. 
The conflict is also setting a precedent in the international justice system, being 
the first conflict where an arrest warrant has been issued against a sitting president by the 
International Criminal Court (ICC, 2004, March). The warrant lists seven counts broken 
down as follows: five counts of crimes against humanity—murder, extermination, 
forcible transfer, torture and rape; and two counts of war crimes—intentionally directing 
attacks against the civilian population not taking part in hostilities, and pillaging. The fact 
that the prosecutors have said there is insufficient evidence to support charges of 
genocide has generated debate about the merits and implications of the ICC’s action. 
Those opposed to the ICC see the charges as creating an obstacle to the ongoing peace 
process. While the USA, EU and France hailed the warrant; the AU, China, and Arab 
League have expressed regrets. Sudan’s reaction was quick, dismissing the ICC’s action 
as a “neo-colonialist” move meant to destabilize it (BBC, 2009, Mar 04). Khartoum 
consequently expelled sixteen humanitarian organizations operating in Darfur.    
B. SCOPE AND PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the nature of the conflict in Darfur, why it 
has persisted from 2003 to the present, while examining its disastrous consequences on 
the population. In particular, this thesis seeks to draw lessons that will inform 
recommendations for the resolution of the conflict.  This study will endeavor to look at 
the historical, social, cultural, economic, and political marginalization of the region. It 
will also assess the role played by the various stakeholders in the conflict to include local, 
regional, and international actors. This analysis will lead to the recommendation that a 
reconciliatory approach drawing from grassroots conflict resolution mechanisms be 
considered the most viable solution to the crisis. This approach is informed by the fact 
that the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) on May 05, 2006 between the 
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warring parties has not resolved the crisis, thus the need for a process that includes 
establishing social coexistence and mechanisms to resolve the conflict at the local level.  
One significant fact that emerges from the literature written on the Sudan and the 
Darfur crisis in particular is that it is a complex emergency resulting from a combination 
of factors that have a long history. Sudan has been at war for forty out of the fifty years of 
its independence.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Generally, insurgencies or rebellions start for a reason—the existence of injustice 
or perceived injustice, which have not been or cannot be addressed by the government of 
the day.  A rebellion begins with a small core group who believe that their cause justifies 
mobilizing the population for armed conflict. Because the government is unwilling or 
unable to resolve the grievances or set the conditions for peaceful resolution, the conflict 
festers.  
The persistence of conflict in the Sudan has remained its defining characteristic 
since the country attained independence in 1956. When the world was about to celebrate 
the end of the north-south conflict following the signing of the ceasefire protocol in 2002, 
word started seeping out about the killings in Darfur. Conflicts arise due to a number of 
factors, which include differences in political ideologies, bad governance, ethnic 
nationalism, economic or religious fears, and in some cases from a combination of two or 
more of these factors. The need to find a solution for the conflict in Darfur has become 
more urgent now given the conflict’s effects within both Darfur and the entire region. 
This is what has inspired this thesis. 
Darfur’s population is largely rural with sedentary farmers and pastoral nomads 
living side by side. The debate that has reduced the crisis in Darfur to a clash between the 
settled farmers who happen to be non-Arabs against nomadic pastoralists who are Arab 
can be misleading, leading to inappropriate solution sets being prescribed.  Local 
competition has been worsened by the ecological changes that have been slowly taking 
place in the Sahel with the Saharan desert extending southwards, forcing a population 
migration in search of water, pasture and better soils.  
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This study will look at the history of Sudan to learn how demographic shifts, 
resource scarcity, and the evolution of the political system have affected the cohesiveness 
of the society. Given the current state where 250,000 Darfurians are refugees in Chad and 
a further 2.7 million are living in IDP camps, the hope of their ever returning home 
depends on the type of resolution achieved between the warring parties. Further, the 
continued violence in Darfur has direct and indirect effects on the success of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the civil war between the north and 
the south. It is with this background that a reconciliation approach driven by grassroots 
concerns is proposed as a lasting solution for the people of Darfur.  
An important way to find a possible solution to this conflict is to understand the 
causes of the crisis and the problems involved in its management. To achieve this, the 
study will endeavor to answer the following questions: 
1. What are the fundamental causes that led to the crisis? 
2. How can a process of reconciliation be achieved? 
3. Who are the stakeholders that need to be involved to secure the reconciliation 
peace process? 
4. What needs to be considered for reconciliation to take root and create space 
for trust and confidence to be rebuilt among Darfur’s people? 
In answering these questions, the study will look at the various stakeholders so as 
to identify the spoilers capable of stopping a consensus from being built in Darfur.  
Historically, over the course of many centuries of coexistence and cooperation 
among the various ethnic groups within Darfur, traditions of mutual understanding, 
respect, and interethnic tolerance developed among the Arabs and non-Arabs, farmers 
and nomadic pastoralists. One question this thesis poses is how can these systems, which 
served the region for many years, be revived and used so as to enable the people of 
Darfur to accept one another and live together again? 
Besides understanding local dynamics, it is necessary to look at regional and 
international involvement in Darfur. The task of reconciling the people of Darfur is a 
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daunting one and will require a coordinated and united approach by all stakeholders so as 
to prevent the spoilers from impeding the process. Therefore, this study will also look at 
the role of other players (stakeholders) to include Chad, Libya, Egypt, Eritrea, USA, 
China, the African Union, the UN, and humanitarian organizations.  
D. STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
The current chapter provides an overview introduction to the conflict. Chapter II 
will briefly cover the factors that are said to have led to the current conflict. Chapter III 
will cover the factors that have prolonged the conflict. In order to understand the conflict 
in Darfur, there is a need to delve into Sudan’s turbulent history and its unique position, 
lying between Arab North Africa and Sub-Saharan black Africa, a key variable that plays 
out in the clash of cultures in Darfur. Like most African conflict scenarios, the variables 
involved in this analysis are firmly rooted in Sudanese history (both pre-colonial and 
colonial) and its effects on the postcolonial governing regimes.  
Chapter IV will present the proposed solution for reconciliation. It will highlight 
what needs to be taken into consideration in order for trust to take root in Darfur. 
Recognizing that reconciliation alone will not bring peace, measures for economic 
development, poverty alleviation, and provision of alternative means of livelihood need 
to be considered. Finally, Chapter V will provide the conclusions and recommendations 
from the study. 
E. ARGUMENT 
The argument presented in this thesis is that for decades the people of Darfur 
lived in harmony, intermarried, and had such cordial social relations that led many who 
visited the region to marvel at the lack of distinction in terms of color or race between 
those who claim Arab identity from local African tribes. The conflict that has caused vast 
suffering to the people of Darfur is a result of political manipulation, not the result of 
inherent tribal/racial differences. The social fabric that held the Darfurian society together 
in concert with a system of traditional conflict resolution and mediation mechanisms 
were systematically and deliberately eroded by successive governing regime’s policies.  
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From the data available (see Table 2) one is tempted to see a correlation between 
the abolition of the native administration and the rise of the number of conflicts in Darfur, 
though other factors also contributed, ranging from increased environmental degradation 
to population growth.  
F. METHODOLOGY 
This study will use a process-tracing methodology to analyze the changes that 
have occurred in the Sudanese way of life with particular attention paid to the policies 
and strategies successive Sudanese regimes pursued that led to, and continue to sustain 
the current situation in Darfur, preventing any meaningful interventions from taking 
place. Only by understanding the historical, ecological, political, social, and economic 
structure of Darfur can we gain a better appreciation of the problem. This study will rely 
on secondary sources of data—books, journals, internet sources, and other written 
material on the Darfur case. It also draws on the author’s experiences serving as a 
Military Observer (MILOB) with the second African Mission in Sudan (AMIS II) from 
January 2005 to January 2006.  
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II. ORIGIN OF THE PROBLEM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Throughout history, groups that have lived side by side for many years without 
tension have turned on each other, resulting in slaughter, as witnessed for instance in 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Bosnia, East Timor, and now Darfur. This begs one to ask what 
has changed to lead to such heinous acts. Though the history of Darfur was not without 
episodes of conflict and violence (see Table 2), the current levels are unprecedented.  
This chapter will provide a brief history of Darfur and trace the root causes that 
have been advanced by many scholars who have written about the conflict. It is my belief 
that the current events in Darfur can only be understood in light of its history. 
B. ENVIRONMENT AND RESOURCE SCARCITY 
Lying entirely in the vast Sahelian belt of desert and semi-desert, savannah and 
oasis make climate a decisive factor in its Darfur’s history. To understand the current 
conflict, we need to look at the effects of ecological crises between 1970 and the mid-
1980s when the civil war between the Arabs and the Fur broke out. Expanding 
desertification forced the Arab nomads to migrate southwards in search of pasture and 
water. Suliman Mohamed (2006) has argued that, in the past, traditional agreements 
facilitated the movement of people and their herds from one ecological zone to another, 
as this was seasonal and for short periods of time. Whenever environmental effects 
became more severe and persistent, the migration became prolonged or even sometimes 
required permanent co-existence. However, when coupled with population growth, the 
strain became greater, building up tensions among the communities. Unfortunately, 
between the 1970s and the mid 1980s, this development occurred at a time when demand 
for land was at its peak for the farmers and other agriculturalists who had started selling 
their produce to growing urban markets in Darfur and elsewhere in Sudan (Johnson, 
2003, p. 139).  
This migration of the Northern tribes southward in response to encroaching 
desertification occurred a time when Sudan’s leader General Jaffar Nemeiri had 
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abolished the native administration in the rural areas, but had yet to forge an effective 
alternative mode of governance. It is reported that in 1986 alone, a total of 384,010 
people migrated south from north Darfur (Mamdani, 2009, p. 237; see Table 2 for the 
details). Conflicts and insecurity escalated in the rural areas as those with access to 
firearms took the law into their own hands and started resolving their disputes by force 
rather than by mediation.   
The ecological crisis was aggravated by the location of the ethnic groups and 
communities in Darfur. The Darfur ecological zone can be divided into three distinct 
categories that correspond with ethnic and cultural borders (Suliman, 2006). The first of 
these zones is arid, predominantly inhabited by Arab camel nomads, and is the most 
disaster-prone and ecologically fragile. Second is the middle zone of Jebel Marra Massif, 
which is the richest area in the region in terms of soil fertility, rainfall, abundance of 
surface and underground water, and other natural resources. The occupants of this area 
are settled traditional farmers who are mainly non-Arab, with Fur comprising the major 
ethnic group. It is in this region where the first communal conflict occurred as a result of 
incursions by the northern camel nomads as well as the southern cattle nomads into the 
fields of Fur peasants. The third, lower or southern zone, is inhabited by cattle-herding 
Arab tribes and is highly susceptible to rainfall fluctuations. Because of these ecological 
and ethnic cleavages, any competition or quarrel took on an ethnic dimension, thereby 
worsening the situation. As John Markakis notes, “of all the ideological weapons used in 
African warfare—nationalism, socialism, religion, and ethnicity—the latter proved by far 
the more superior as a principle of political solidarity and mobilization as well as a 
dominant political force” (as cited in Suliman, 2006, p. 5). This implies that discord over 
resources, once it takes on ethnic overtones, with the survival of a group at stake, will 
persist even if the initial conflict over the resource question has been resolved. 
Hassan Al Mangouri, in his study of the effects of desertification in Umm 
Kaddada district in Eastern Darfur has shown that the shift from traditional form of 
cultivation due to changing ecological conditions and population pressure served to 
accelerate desertification and the spread of sand dunes, which the render the it useless for 
farming (p. 46). This shift has led to a persistent circle of drought, deforestation, shorter 
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fallow periods, less soil fertility and declining crop yields, which inevitably increase the 
tensions and conflicts among the tribes of Darfur. Previous forms of livelihood involved 
crop rotations between millet, sorghum, groundnuts, sesame, watermelons, and gum 
arabic productions. This practice allowed the farmers to earn income by selling gum 
arabic for export, while benefiting from the nitrogen fixing and soil retaining properties 
of the trees, which restored fertility to the soil. With the advent of drought, aided by 
population growth, increased demand for fuel and pressure for more food production led 
to shortened periods of letting the land lie fallow, deforestation, and eventual soil 
degradation. These occurrences were further exacerbated by the in-migration of the 
northern nomads, thus speeding up the process of degradation. 
Table 1.   Number of Migrants from North to South Darfur, 1986. 
Area Council Number Of Migrants 
From North Darfur 
Nyala (Central area) 108,976 
El Dien (Eastern area) 372,849 
Buram (Southern area) 
Zalengei (Western area) 








Source: Mamdani M (2009). 
 
C. COLONIAL LEGACY: “THE MAKING OF NATIVES AND SETTLERS” 
Darfur remained an independent Sultanate longer than any other region of Sudan, 
first coming under foreign rule in 1874 (Turco-Egyptian) and later succumbing to the 
Anglo–Egyptian condominium from 1916–1955 (despite Khartoum having been 
conquered and ruled by external powers in 1899). Given its long history of independence, 
the Darfur region developed systems of governance that emphasized co-existence among 
its multiethnic communities, recognizing the use of both Arabic and Fur languages. 
Mahmood Mamdani (2009) argues that with the advent of colonialism a new 
project involving the retribalization of Darfur was undertaken to facilitate indirect rule, 
whereby land rights were vested in a tribe, with a distinction made between “natives” and 
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“settlers.” The native tribe was entitled to two customary rights: the ownership of land 
and the appointment of key posts in the tribal administration (pp. 166–170). This had the 
effect of discriminating against those categorized as settlers, regardless of how many 
generations they had lived in the area. Mamdani further argues that this colonial 
construction of a “traditional” system set Darfur back politically and socially to the pre-
sultanate period. The effects of these changes surfaced in the 1980s when the Arabs 
demanded greater representation in Darfur’s regional government, and secondly in the 
1990s when the government, in an effort to correct this perceived discrimination, 
undertook the restructuring of administrative boundaries (Flint and De Waal, 2008, pp. 
59–60). The “homelands” awarded to the darless pastoralist communities generated 
intertribal conflicts, leading to the Massalit-Arab war of 1987. This shift in land tenure 
also helped reinforce systematic polarization of the people of Darfur along Arab–African 
lines that helps explain the dynamics of the current conflict.  
D. GOVERNMENT POLICIES 
Sudan has been characterized by political and economic power, concentrated in 
the Nile river valley, and dominated by a relatively small Arab population, to the 
disadvantage of populations in the “peripheral” areas of the East (Beja), the West 
(Darfur), and the South (who, though represented in the Government of National Unity 
(GNU), thanks to the signing of the CPA in 2005, still remain marginal. This is the 
subject of the Black Book: Imbalance of power and Wealth in Sudan, which enumerates 
the domination of all government sectors by officials drawn from three tribes: the 
Ja ’aliyin of President al-Bashir, the Shaygiyya of Vice President Osman Taha, and the 
Danagala of Defense Minister Bakri Hassan Saleh, who live along the Nile near 
Khartoum (De Waal & Prunier, 2008, pp. 16–17). The two rebel groups centered in 
Darfur, the SLA and JEM, cite their reason for rebellion as the continued political and 
economic marginalization by the central Khartoum government. To unravel this 
marginalization argument, this section looks at the various policies undertaken by 
successive Khartoum regimes. Though the Darfur region is ecologically fragile and 
composed of a complex mosaic of tribal and racial interactions, which themselves can 
lead to conflict, government policies have to be considered critical in setting the 
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necessary conditions. Key among these were: abolition of the native administration, 
restructuring of the land tenure system and politically motivated changes made to the 
administrative boundaries, and mobilization of militias. It can be argued that these 
policies were undertaken to help sustain an otherwise weak state whose legitimacy did 
not extend much beyond the Nile Valley, and the immediate surroundings of Khartoum. 
This in turn leads to the question: what is the nature of the Sudanese state?  
1. Nature of the Sudanese State 
Sudan’s size as the largest country on the African continent, has presented 
Khartoum with governance challenges. According to Robert I. Rotberg (2002), “Nation-
states exist to deliver political goods—security, education, health services, economic 
opportunity, environmental surveillance, a legal framework of order and a judicial system 
to administer it, and fundamental infrastructural requirements such as roads and 
communications facilities—to their citizens” (p. 87). Given this description, where does 
Sudan lie along the spectrum of effective delivery of political goods? More specifically, 
how should Sudan state be judged when it comes to its western region? I will look at the 
weakness of the state in two ways: first, at its failure to extend and exercise effective 
control, and secondly, at its failure to deliver services to its peripheral areas, thereby 
generating discontent and rebellion.   
The complex nature of the Sudanese state is captured by de Waal’s (2007) 
observation that:  
Describing the Sudanese state as either “strong” or “weak” fails to do 
justice to this complicated reality. It leads to the paradoxical situation in 
which the state is failing to deliver on basic governance functions for most 
Sudanese citizens, while the establishment demonstrates an astonishing 
capacity to not only survive but also prosper. The prospects of dislodging 
the dominant elite groups, however fractious they may be, are remote. (p. 
7) 
When the British conquered Darfur and united it with Sudan in 1916, they 
adopted the system of “indirect rule” to govern the region. Though the British “indirect 
rule” has been criticized for isolating communities from the benefits of the modern world, 
while exploiting them for the colonialists’ benefit (Prunier, 2008, p. 29), nevertheless, 
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indirect rule did serve to help reduce and resolve conflicts whenever they occurred. After 
independence in 1956, Darfur remained marginal due to its distance from the center, and 
was marked by resource scarcity and poor infrastructure. The substance-based economic 
activities in this region, with one sector of the population specializing in faming, while 
the other specialized in pastoral nomadism, served to keep the region peripheral. In this 
period we could say the marginalization of Darfur was regional and not racial or ethnic.  
It was not until the 1960s that a racial narrative began to take shape during the 
debate over the kind of constitution to be adopted in Sudan. Opposition to the Islamic 
constitution, which was being supported by the northern Khartoum regime, was rejected 
by delegates from the South, Nuba, and Darfur (Prunier, 2008, p. 41) as they preferred a 
secular constitution. This marked one of the first signs of cleavage, with the majority 
Muslims in the north separated from the other Sudanese along ethnic and regional lines.  
2. Native Administration 
The traditional governance structure in Darfur has undergone systematic 
weakening since independence in 1956. Under the native administration system the tribal 
leadership had legal authority until 1971, when it was abolished by enactment of the 
“People’s Local Government Act which divided the region into regional, district and area 
councils” (Abdul-Jalil, Mohammed, and Yousuf, 2007, p. 50). Though renewed in 1986, 
the Native Administration Act had significantly changed, with much reduced powers for 
the traditional leaders and greater reliance on elected or appointed officials. Other major 
changes included the redrawing of state boundaries breaking up tribal homelands (dar).  
The traditional system of governance had organic and long tested mechanisms for 
managing and resolving disputes. With the passage of the People’s Local Government 
Act tribal leaders lost their jurisdictional authority, meaning that one tribe could be 
granted control by the central government over land belonging to another. This increased 
competition and clashes. In addition, the previous tribal system had delineated simple, 
but well established and recognized routes to manage the migration of nomads during dry 
seasons. With the abolition of this system, conflict management tools like this were lost. 
Another consequence of abandoning the traditional system is that with it went traditional 
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environmental conservation mechanisms, thus exacerbating environmental degradation. 
Available data shows that before 1970 only five conflicts in Darfur required formal 
mediation (see Table 2 for details), while from 1970 onwards an average of one conflict 
per year required formal resolution agreement (Mamdani, 2009, p. 235).  
Table 2.   Summary: Conflicts Resolution Agreements in Darfur 1932–2000. 
No TRIBAL GROUP INVOLVED YEAR MAJOR CAUSES OF THE 
CONFLICT 
1 Kababish, Kawahla, Berti and Medoub 1932 grazing and water rights 
2 Kababish, Medoub and Zayyadia 1957 grazing and water rights 
3 Rizeigat, Baggara and Maaliya 1968 local politics and administration 
4 Rizeigat, Baggara, Maaliya and Dinka 1975 grazing and water rights 
5 Beni Helba, Zayydia and Mahriya 1976 grazing and water rights
6 Northern Rizeigat (Abbala) and Dago 1976 grazing and water rights 
7 Northern Reizeigat and Bargo 1978 grazing and water rights
8 Northern Reizeigat and Gimir 1978 grazing and water rights
9 Northern Reizeigat and Fur 1980 grazing and water rights
10 Northern Rizeigat and Bargo 1980 grazing and water rights
11 Taisha and Salamat 1980 local politics and administration 
12 Kababish, Berti and Zayyadia 1981 grazing and water rights
13 Rezeigat Baggara and Dinka 1981 grazing and water rights
14 Northern Reizeigat and Beni Helba 1982 grazing and water rights
15 Kababish, Kawahla, Berti and Medoub 1982 grazing and water rights
16 Rezeigat and Mysseriya 1983 grazing and water rights
17 Kababish,Berti and Medoub 1984 grazing and water rights
18 Rezeigat and Mysseriya 1984 grazing and water rights
19 Gimir and Fallata (Fulani) 1987 administrative boundaries 
20 Kababish, Kawahla, Berti and Medoub 1987 grazing and water rights 
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No TRIBAL GROUP INVOLVED YEAR MAJOR CAUSES OF THE 
CONFLICT 
21 Fur and Bidayat 1989 armed robberies 
22 Arab and Fur 1989 grazing, cross-boundary politics 
23 Zaghawa and Gimir 1990 administrative boundaries 
24 Zaghawa and Gimir 1990 administrative boundaries 
25 Taisha and Gimir 1990 Land 
26 Bargo and Rezeigat 1990 grazing and water rights 
27 Zaghawa and Maaliya 1991 land 
28 Zaghawa and Marareit 1991 grazing and water rights
29 Zaghawa and Beni Hussein 1991 grazing and water rights
30 Zaghawa and Mima and Birgid 1991 grazing and water rights
31 Zaghawa v. Birgid 1991 grazing and water rights
32 Zaghawa and Birgid 1991 grazing and water rights
33 Fur and Turgum 1991 land 
34 Zaghawa and Arab 1994 grazing and water rights 
35 Zaghawa Sudan v. Zaghawa Chad 1994 Power and politics 
36 Massalit and Arab 1996 Grazing, administration 
37 Zaghawa and Rezeigat 1997 Local politics 
38 Kababish Arab and Medoub 1997 grazing and water rights
39 Massalit and Arab 1996 Grazing, administration
40 Zaghawa and Gimir 1999 Grazing, administration
41 Fur and Arab 2000 grazing, politics, armed robberies 
Source: Mamdani M. (2009, p. 346). 
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On top of this came enactment of the Regional Government Act in 1979. Its 
premise was to make the provincial government closer to the people. Under this Act all 
regions had governors appointed from among the locals, except for Darfur where 
Governor al- Tayeb al-Mardi, from the Nile Valley was appointed, not with Darfur issues 
in mind but to coordinate the support the Nimeiri regime was providing to Chadian, 
Hissen Habre, who was leading a rebellion against the Chadian government (Prunier, 
2008, p. 48). Residents of Darfur interpreted this move as proof of how little the 
Khartoum government cared about their welfare in relation to geopolitical calculations. In 
their view, President Nemeiri was more concerned with the prospect of losing his anti-
Libyan base of operations than he was about the unrest his appointment of a non-
Darfurian governor might generate.  
 This appointment also had the effect of increasing racial antagonisms, which had 
been building because of the many years of marginalization by the central authorities. Al-
Tayeb’s appointment just served to confirm the lack of concern by the regime. However, 
Nimeiri did eventually give in to the unrest when he sacked the governor and replaced 
him with a local, Ahmed Ibrahim Diraige, whose credentials as a member of the Darfur 
Development Front (DDF) gained him wide acceptance (Prunier, 2008, p. 50). 
Unfortunately, Diraige’s efforts to revive the deplorable state of Darfur after so many 
years of neglect received little support from the central Khartoum regime. Diraige’s task 
was further complicated by the drought and famine that were raging in the 1980s. 
Government policies on local agriculture, infrastructure, and provision of water holes 
were deficient to say the least. Although the government claimed not be able to spare any 
funds for these projects it continued to supply arms to Hissen Habre’s guerrillas; this 
again showed where the priorities of the Khartoum government lay. 
Further changes in administrative structure done with the intention of changing 
the demographics of Darfur in favor of the Arabs were made in 1994, when Darfur was 
split into three states: South Darfur whose headquarters was at Nyala, North Darfur with 
headquarters in El-Fasher, and West Darfur headquartered in El Geneina. This divided 
the Fur, the largest tribe, and rendered them a minority in all three states (International 
Crisis Group, 2007, p. 8). With these changes, and the annexation of the northern part of 
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Darfur to the Northern state, isolated Darfur denying it revenue from trade with Libya. 
This maneuvering by the Khartoum regime was intended to weaken the power of the non-
Arab tribes to gain leverage in future political contests, particularly in elections that 
would require numbers.  
All of these decisions and changes served to increase tensions and suspicions 
among the peoples of Darfur. For example, further reforms in 1995 divided dar Massalit 
into 13 emirates, with six emirates being given to Arab tribes, mostly immigrants from 
Chad. This led to the diminished status and loss of authority for the Massalit Sultan, 
resulting in devastating ethnic conflict between the Massalit and the Arabs (Abdul-Jalil, 
Mohammed, and Yousuf, 2007, p. 57).  
3. Land Tenure 
Historically, two methods of land ownership were recognized in Sudan: 
individual and communal. Individual ownership was mostly limited to the area around 
the Nile valley, from Gezira downstream. In Darfur, on the other hand, land was 
collectively owned by the members of the tribe with the tribal leadership determining its 
use. Tribal leaders had extensive powers to allocate parcels of land to their members for 
dwelling, grazing, agriculture, or other forms of use. In 1970, President Jaafar Nimeiri’s 
military regime passed the Unregistered Land Act, declaring all un-registered land to be 
the property of the state (Tubiana, 2007). This meant that the majority of the land in 
Sudan, and almost the entire region of Darfur, was to be considered state owned. This Act 
opened the door to widespread abuse of rural land tenure as the state could now freely 
allocate land to whomever it deemed fit.  
Darfur’s traditional land tenure system, which developed during the Fur sultanate, 
and operated according to clear guidelines on land use, ensured harmony in the multi-
ethnic Darfur sultanate (Tubiana, 2007). Individual rights to land were recognized and 
could be inherited, but land could not be passed on or sold to outsiders. Thus, land 
remained the joint property of the clan/tribe, with provisions made to accommodate those 
outside the tribe to use but not own land.   
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According to Sean O’Fahey and Abu Salim “Masters of the land, the sultans, 
distributed hawakir (territories with clear boundaries, singular hakura) to Fur leaders and 
dignitaries, to leaders from other groups who were their vassals and to Faqis (Muslim 
scholars)” (as cited in Tubiana, 2007, p. 73). This system ensured that no tribe was 
excluded from access to land, thus ensuring tribal co-existence. However, the legal 
authority of the 1970 Act, that assigned all unregistered land to the state, increased the 
agitation by the “darless” Arabs to be allocated their own “dar.” This helped ignite 
competition between tribes that had previously managed their affairs through the 
traditional land tenure system, and with the government supporting the Arab tribes the 
conflicts escalated to the current levels. What is important to add is that the traditional 
system had also ensured that key features associated with agricultural land, such as water 
holes and pasturelands were likewise shared according to clear guidelines. This too, had 
helped preserve harmonious co-existence between the Arabs (nomads), and non-Arab 
farmers. 
For the people of Darfur as in most African societies, the value of land is not 
merely economic. It is critical to the identity, and is embedded in the social structure and 
history of the community. As a hub around which customs, culture and traditions revolve, 
land holds very high symbolic or emotional value. This is yet another reason the division 
of dar Massalit generated so much resentment and communal conflict with the Massalit 
tribe striving   to protect their identity and position in the tribal hierarchy.  
E. THE NORTH–SOUTH CIVIL WAR AND THE PEACE PROCESS 
The civil war between northern and southern Sudan, which lasted for 21 years, 
officially came to an end following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA) on 9 January 2005. The north-south civil war and the peace process have had both 
direct and indirect effects on security and stability in Darfur. First, the government of 
Sudan (GoS) recruited militias from Darfur to fight in the south. For example, during the 
1980s Nimeiri mobilized murahaleen (militias) that included the Baggarra Reseigat from 
southern Darfur (Johnson, 2003, pp. 81–83). This resulted in the increased militarization 
of Darfur, with many Darfurians being trained in warfare and becoming accustomed to 
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operating in a war economy. Another example of the north-south war spilling over into 
Darfur came in 1991 when the SPLA sponsored incursions led by Daoud Boulad, a 
Darfurian who was formerly a member of the Islamic movement. Boulad was arrested 
and eventually executed making the end of his movement. This increased the tension 
between the Arab vs. African tribes, leading to a massacre of the Dinka in El-Daein 
South Darfur in 1986 (Daly, 2007, p. 239). The Dinka, found predominantly in south 
Sudan, had fled the north-south civil war and sought refuge in South Darfur. Following 
Boulad’s unsuccessful rebellion, they were seen as supporting the southern rebellion, 
which the government now viewed as spreading to Darfur. Thus, the government 
mobilized the murahaleen militias against them.  
Secondly, the civil war drained development resources, leading to further 
marginalization of Darfur. Coupled with international economic sanctions and IMF 
suspension of aid to Sudan, no donor could provide any assistance besides relief aid.  
The third effect of the north-south peace process was its exclusive nature. The 
peace process has been viewed as having reduced the problems in Sudan to a single 
North-South problem, disregarding the claims of people in other peripheral regions such 
as Eastern Beja and Western Darfur. This continues to raise questions about how 
comprehensive the CPA is, or should be considered to be. At the same time, the peace 
process signaled that the reward for armed struggle is negotiation. Indeed, some believe 
that this encouraged the rebellion in Darfur.  This argument is in agreement with Allan 
Kuperman’s (2005) thesis about “genocidal rebellion.” Kuperman sees the situation as 
one in which a rebel group was willing to risk the lives of its people by rising up against a 
relatively strong government in the hope that international humanitarian intervention 
would help facilitate their victory. According to such a view, the Darfur conflict can be 
considered to have resulted from the rebels calculating the expected benefits from 
humanitarian intervention.  
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F. MOBILIZATION OF MILITIAS AND MILITARIZATION OF THE 
REGION 
Throughout this period, the Sudanese government manipulated mounting racial 
tensions between the Arabs and blacks non-Arabs in Darfur to its own ends. These 
tensions reached extreme dimensions during the civil war of 1987–1989 between the Fur 
and united Arab tribes referred to as the “Arab gathering” The government in Khartoum 
inflamed the clash by supporting and arming the Arab tribes, in part to prevent southern 
Sudanese rebels from gaining a foothold in the region. Because of this policy of 
government support to Arab militias, the African tribes (Fur, Massalit and Zaghawa) in 
turn formed self-defense groups, out of which came the first Darfur insurgent group in 
2003 (Straus, 2005, p. 126). In effect, Khartoum was fighting a proxy war with the people 
of Darfur (mainly the black African tribes) using the Arab Janjaweed militias. The name 
Janjaweed was originally derived from “fursan (horsemen, Knight) mujahedeen” 
(International Commission of Inquiry Report, 2005, p. 30). Janjaweed are Arab tribal 
militias recruited and armed by the government to support the army’s military operations. 
However, the Khartoum authorities deny supporting these notorious militias. The 
International Commission of Inquiry, established in pursuant to United Nation Security 
Council resolution 1564 (2004), to investigate the crimes in Darfur confirmed that the 
Janjaweed not only received weapons and logistics from the government, but they also 
have close ties with government officials (p. 34). The name was also was used as a 
derogatory term to categorize bandit and criminal groups in Darfur.  
In 2002 the governor of Darfur General Suleiman recognized the futility of using 
militias to fight the rebels, and instead advised a strategy of negotiations, stating that the 
Darfurians had genuine grievances regarding their political and developmental needs, 
which needed to be addressed (Flint and de Waal, 2008, pp. 116–123). But instead of 
being heeded, General Suleiman was sacked, Musa Hilal (a notorious Janjaweed leader 
who has since been indicted by ICC for human rights abuses) was released from jail, and 
militia recruitment intensified, three events that set the stage for the bloodiest period 
(2003–2004) in Darfur.  
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G. CONCLUSION 
In sum, we can say that the violence that rocked Darfur has its roots in historical 
injustice, uneven distribution of resources, and debilitating environmental conditions, 
which were exacerbated by poor political leadership that in turn set the stage for 
ethnic/racial flare-ups. Faced with a strong rebellion, the GoS adopted tactics that had 
been developed and employed in the North-South civil war that, among other things, 
involved arming the Janjaweed militia. This served to further polarize the ethnic/racial 
divisions in Darfur into an Arab-Africa conflict that acquired currency with the media 
and those writing about this conflict, since it seemed to mirror the North-South civil war 
that pitted the Muslim north against the Christian or animist Africans of southern Sudan. 
Despite concerted efforts by the AU, with the support of the international community, the 
conflict persists to date. The next chapter will address the factors that have prolonged this 
conflict.  
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III. WHAT HAS PROLONGED THE CONFLICT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Darfur crisis is now entering its sixth year, though the killings have been 
reduced to almost pre-war their levels thanks to humanitarians’ concerted and persistent 
efforts to assist the displaced. Still, violence remains at unacceptably high levels. One 
reason for the current lull is the DPA negotiated under AU auspices with assistance from 
the international community. The DPA was signed on May 5, 2006, by the GoS and only 
one rebel group, SLA/MM, led by Minni Minnawi. The agreement consists of three 
protocols: power sharing, wealth sharing, and a security arrangement. There is also an 
additional “chapter” laying out the framework for “Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and 
Consultation (DDDC). Two rebel groups, the JEM and the SLA/AW, refused to sign the 
agreement, with Abdel Wahid, the leader of SLA/AW faction, citing two reasons: first, 
the need for more direct SLA participation in the implementation of the security 
arrangement, and second, the agreement did not provide for adequate political 
representation or a victim’s compensation fund (International Crisis Group, June 20, 
2006, p. 1). 
While many consider the DPA to be a triumph, its future remain uncertain due to 
a number of reasons. Among them, the government of Sudan lacks the political will to 
implement the objectives set out in the DPA. The proliferation of rebel groups has also 
led to a divided agenda, weakening their bargaining power in the negotiation process. 
The lack of a unified and coordinated effort by international community has similarly 
prevented sufficient pressure from being brought to bear on the parties to the conflict. 
Lastly, failure to involve all the stakeholders in the peace process has proved costly.  
For instance, the AU mediators failed to give the people of Darfur and the victims 
of the conflict—particularly women, internally displaced persons, and non-aligned Arab 
groups—an adequate voice at the talks. This oversight was only realized at the very end 
of the negotiation process, which involved the GoS and only three rebel groups 
recognized by the AU. The AU tried to secure buy-in from the Darfurians through what it 
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called the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) process. However, since the 
DPA was already dead on arrival, render the DDDC meaningless before it could begin. 
One important lesson learned, therefore should be that any peace initiative has to involve 
all the stakeholders affected by the conflict.  
Also, the longer a peace process drags on, the more new challenges emerge, 
especially when a large part of the population remains displaced from their homes. For 
example, those who have occupied the land of the displaced will find it hard to revert 
back to their original landless status with the passage of time, especially in a situation 
where the senior members of the community will have passed on or have become too old 
to be effective participants in the peace and reconciliation process. In addition, the 
generations now growing up in IDP camps and receiving aid will lose the opportunity to 
learn the survival, subsistence, and coping strategies/mechanisms that have been passed 
on from generation to generation and which are so location-specific and necessary in 
Darfur’s fragile and delicate environment.  
Also of significance is that the channeling of the population into IDP camps, 
coupled with continuing violence around these camps, has led to changes in social roles. 
Traditionally it was men who went out into the fields to perform manual labor in order to 
provide for their families. But with the fear of being targeted, roles have been inverted; 
females have become the providers while the men have confined themselves to the IDP 
camps.  
In addition to factors like these affecting civilian stakeholders, the DPA face 
ongoing challenges since only two parties, GoS and SLA/MM, signed the agreement, 
with the other two factions, SLA/AW and JEM, failing to sign. Consequently, around the 
time of the signing, the peace process was greeted with a deteriorating situation on the 
ground in Darfur. There was a marked increase in violence directed at civilians, IDPs, 
members of the humanitarian community, and even the AU peacekeepers (AU Report, 
2009, June 27). Such a situation begs the question, what processes can be put in place to 
protect or quarantine the peace process from spoilers messing it up? It is evident that 
peace cannot be negotiated in an atmosphere of violence and insecurity, and thus there 
have been calls for a credible plan for the disarmament and demobilization of the 
 25
Janjaweed militias and other rebel groups. However, the DPA was particularly weak in 
articulating and delineating how, and by whom, implementation of the agreements 
reached was to be undertaken. First, DPA relied heavily on the Khartoum government to 
carry out disarmament of the Janjaweed militias, a task that the GoS had failed to 
complete on two previous occasions. Also, the AU force which was tasked with 
providing protection to civilians and monitoring compliance with the provisions of the 
Agreement lacked the capacity to meet these requirements.  
B. PRIMARY STAKEHOLDERS 
1. Lack of Commitment by the Khartoum Government  
The GoS, being one of the belligerents in concert with its proxy Janjaweed 
militias, has been cited as responsible for many of the atrocities committed against the 
civilian population in Darfur. Faced with a rebellion, the GoS conducted a classic 
counterinsurgency operation of “draining the swamp” by indiscriminate targeting of the 
population further alienated the population. Thus, the government’s repressive methods 
increased rebel mobilization as more civilians were now willing to join the insurgents or 
provide passive support.  
Meanwhile, the motivation for the Janjaweed in joining the conflict on the 
government’s side was the prospect of gaining land by systematically pushing non-Arab 
farmers out of their homes, a process which seems to have succeeded as currently most of 
the population lives as either refugees or IDPs. The various peace initiatives that have 
been undertaken have identified the imperative need to disarm these militia groups, but 
the onus of doing so has devolved to the GoS, which has proved time and again unable or 
unwilling to.  
The Khartoum government has routinely shown that it cannot be relied upon to 
deliver or adhere to any agreement it makes as it makes these agreements out of 
expediency. For instance, though the CPA was signed in 2005 to end the North-South 
war, many of its provisions have been rejected by the presiding National Congress Party 
(NCP) in Khartoum. According to the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon, the main 
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obstacle to the peaceful solution to the Darfur conflict is the “lack of political will among 
all the parties to pursue a peaceful solution” (Sudan Tribune, 2008, April 17). 
The security situation remains very unstable and violence has escalated. In 
Darfur, the Sudanese government has also been unwilling to cooperate and change its 
political position. For instance, since political marginalization was one of the root causes 
of the conflict, the power sharing protocol in the DPA is arguably one of the key items 
for helping achieve peace. During the negotiations, the rebel movements argued for the 
Darfur region to be represented at the national level by a Vice Presidency. However, the 
government delegation refused this request, as it would affect the delicate power balance 
in the government of national unity (GNU) established following the signing of the CPA 
between the NCP and SPLA (International Crisis Group, 2006, June 20, p. 7).  
The Khartoum regime likewise adopted a strategy of obstructionism concerning 
deployment of UN peacekeepers. The Sudanese regime’s intransigence meant that the 
UN mission that was scheduled to start operations in 2006 was ultimately delayed, 
impacting the peace process. Despite having eventually accepted the deployment of a UN 
force in the form of UNAMID, Khartoum continues to manipulate and undermine the 
forces’ operational machinery, first by refusing the participation of non-African troops, 
but also by restricting their having a free hand in the operation area. For example, 
Khartoum has required prior notice for flight operations and has restricted nighttime 
flights. These measures have not only impaired the mission’s operational flexibility, but 
also denied UNAMID specialized assets from traditional UN troop-contributing countries 
such as Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan (Gowan, 2008, p. 461)  
2. Rebel Proliferation 
Since the initial conflict in 2003, the number of rebel factions has increased 
dramatically from the initial two groups, the JEM and the SLA, to approximately 27 
separate factions (Ochieng, 2008, January 28). Proposed causes for the rebel proliferation 
include: divisions between SLA leaders triggered by outside support from the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), uneasy alliance between the ethnic Fur and 
Zaghawa tribes, Sudanese government manipulation of SLA geographical and ethnic 
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differences, generational clash between young field commanders and elder tribal 
intellectuals, and exiled leadership that exacerbated the power vacuum within the 
burgeoning SLA (International Crisis Group, 2005, and Tanner and Tubiana, 2007).This 
proliferation of the rebel groups continues to complicate the peace process. Similarly, the 
proliferation of the rebel movements has increased insecurity in the region, affecting the 
humanitarian delivery of aid to the affected population (OCHA, 2007, July). The safe 
passage negotiated by the humanitarian groups to deliver aid is affected with each entry 
of a new rebel movement. For a peace process to be possible, the interests of all the 
affected parties must be represented, a daunting task given the nature of rebel 
proliferation.  
In addition to the challenge of rebel proliferation, there has been increased 
internal in-fighting over land and power, which has resulted in fragmentation within the 
Arab tribes. Some have gone so far as to distance themselves from the NCP (International 
Crisis Group, 2007, November 26). This presents both challenges and opportunities for 
the peace process. One challenge is that the NCP no longer seems able to control the 
Arab tribes who constitute the Janjaweed militias. On the other hand, this could present 
an opportunity if these groups can be engaged directly. The NCP has often used them for 
its political advantages, and thereby undermined chances for a lasting reconciliation. 
Negotiating with them directly could help circumvent the NCP’s manipulations.  
3. Internally Displaced People (IDPs), Refugees and Civilians 
Since the conflict erupted in 2003, over 2.7 million Darfurians have been 
internally displaced. These stakeholders have a strong interest in returning to their land, 
and to a stable environment with access to water and food. They also have a claim to 
some form of compensation for the atrocities committed against them. Their return is 
prevented, however, by the continued insecurity coupled with the destruction of their 
means of livelihood following the scorch earth tactics used by the GoS and the Janjaweed 
militias. Compounding these problems is the challenge presented by illegal squatters who 
have occupied their land with the blessing of the GoS, which is keen on changing the 
regional demographics in favor of its perceived supporters.  
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Six plus years of destruction have also altered the landscape in Darfur thanks to 
the chopping down of trees and removal of markers, making it impossible to identify land 
boundaries. This will present an additional challenge for resettlement, and will call for 
patient employment of local traditional reconciliation and conflict management 
mechanisms to re-establish property rights and boundaries.  
C. SECONDARY/EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS 
Secondary and external actors also have to be considered stakeholders. These 
include both state and non-state actors who have an interest in the Darfur conflict and 
have contributed in the intervention efforts or prolongation of the crisis.  
1. Lack of Unified Response by the International Community 
When the atrocities in the Darfur region were first reported, the international 
organizations (UN, EU, and AU) were slow to react. International responses finally came 
in the wake pressure from aid agencies and the media. The pressure they exerted was 
sufficiently strong that the US brought the matter to the attention of the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC). The slow response by the international community to the 
Darfur crisis was in part due to the ongoing North-South peace talks, which had reached a 
crucial phase.  The participants felt that any act that would put pressure on the Khartoum 
government would run the risk of destabilizing the talks, which had achieved impressive 
progress towards ending the 21-year-old civil war. For its part, the Khartoum regime 
accurately predicted that the international body was too preoccupied with the north-south 
peace process to take any notice of the western region, and that their counterinsurgency 
operation would achieve a quick victory, an assessment which in retrospect was wrong.  
In May 2004, the U.S. State Department, after a full investigation of the atrocities, 
declared the killings in Darfur to be “genocide.” Alex De Waal points out the importance 
of labeling the Darfur crisis a genocide, “because it broadens the usage of the term 
“genocide” to include ethnically targeted killings, rapes and displacement perpetuated in 
the course of counterinsurgency, a significant expansion of the customary usage of the 
term to refer to the attempt to eliminate entire population” (de Waal, 2007, p. 1041). 
While the U.S. was passing this verdict of genocide, the EU and the AU could not agree 
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on the use of the term, though there was no dispute about the fact that atrocities were 
being perpetrated by the Khartoum government and its proxy Janjaweed militias, and 
many more lives and property were being lost or destroyed as the world debated about 
what to call the crisis.  
In an effort to bring the situation under control, the United Nations Security 
Council passed several resolutions. The first, Resolution 1564 (July 2004), added Darfur 
as an additional mandate under the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), which was 
overseeing the north-south peace process. Resolution 1590, which established a 
committee to monitor the implementation of the measure on Darfur, was passed in early 
2005.  In July 2007, UNSCR 1769 reflected consensus among all members of the 
Security Council concerning the UN/AU hybrid operation in Darfur, to be called the UN 
African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).  
If any lesson can be learned from the success of the CPA, which has brought 
relative peace to South Sudan since it was signed in 2005, it is the need for a strong 
coordinated action by the international community. The CPA was realized in large part 
because the international community (especially the U.S., the United Kingdom, and 
Norway) demonstrated strong leadership, invested heavily in diplomacy, and applied 
coordinated leverage on the parties to the conflict. For the Darfur case, any peace process 
must receive backing from the core group of countries with the most leverage over the 
parties. In the case of Darfur, these should include the U.S., the United Kingdom, France, 
and China, backed by focused incentives and pressure from the UN Security Council 
through the AU mediation mechanisms already in place.  
2 Competing Interests—Counterterrorism, Commercial Connections or 
Solidarity 
Although the conflict in Darfur has received an unprecedented amount of 
international and media attention, the gap between rhetoric and action is quite profound. 
John Prendergast, senior advisor at the International Crisis Group, highlights the 
inadequate response and lack of a coherent strategy or policy for engaging the Khartoum 
government. As he puts it, “What is driving U.S. policy and that of the broader 
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international community is a strategy of constructive engagement with the Khartoum 
regime driven either by consideration of counterterrorism (United States), commercial 
connection (China, Russia, and some other European countries) and solidarity (Arab 
League)” (Prendergast, March 1, 2007). Self-interest of this sort has led to strong rhetoric 
and resolutions that suggest, but do not lead to increased pressure on Khartoum, and only 
served to encourage the regime to intensify its divide and destroy policy in Darfur in the 
interim. In addition, the U.S. and its allies have not been willing to intervene militarily in 
Sudan, as they are already over-committed in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
China’s business interests drive its relations with Sudan, especially its policy of 
“non-interference with domestic affairs” of a country. Chinese leaders say that human 
rights are relative, and each country should be allowed its own definition and timetable 
for reaching them (Hanson, 2008). Currently, China is working closely with the NCP to 
develop Sudan’s oil industry, as well as to improve basic infrastructure and build dams. 
China has huge oil investments in Sudan, and buys two-thirds of the oil the GoS controls. 
China could play a very important role in ending the conflict in Darfur if it would utilize 
its political leverage against the GoS. Yet, Khartoum fully understand that China’s 
increased demand for energy and the need to secure new sources to satisfy its needs 
means that issues touching on human rights and good governance will always come 
second.  
D. AFRICAN UNION 
Since its inception in 2002, the African Union has made peace and security one of 
its chief priorities. Its key organ, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) that came into 
operation in March 2004, faced the immediate challenge in April 2004 of rising to the 
occasion and delivering on the N’djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA) 
between the Government of Sudan and the rebel forces, mediated by Idris Deby, the 
president of Chad.  
Article 1 of the HFCA called for the cessation of hostilities so as to allow for fast 
and unrestricted humanitarian access to the needy population, and also to pave the way 
for a just and durable solution to the problem of Darfur (AU Report, October 2005). With 
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no other organization ready to monitor compliance with this ceasefire agreement, the AU 
hurriedly deployed its monitors in Darfur without adequate pre-deployment and logistical 
assessments.  The initial mandate of AMIS I was to assist the parties in conflict to reach a 
political settlement. It was tasked to monitor and observe compliance with the HCFA; 
undertake confidence building; facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance; assist 
IDPs in their camps and eventually facilitate their repatriation; and promote overall 
security in Darfur. In accordance with this agreement, the AU deployed an initial team of 
60 African Military Observers (MILOBs) and a 300-strong MILOB protection force. In 
addition, it was agreed that the parties to the conflict, as well as representatives from the 
international community, namely the EU and the US, would participate in the mission. 
The deployment of AMIS I presented many challenges to the AU and its partner states. 
Some of the key shortcomings that have plagued the AU deployment since 2004, and 
which have led many critics to view it as spineless and ineffective, include: too restrictive 
a mandate; inadequate numbers of troops to cover Darfur, which is the size of France; 
and serious operational, logistical, and capacity shortfalls. 
Given these glaring shortcomings, an enhanced force was called for which the 
parties to the conflict—the GoS, SLA/M and JEM—accepted (AU Communiqué, 4 
October 2004). The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) approved on 20 October 2004 
a plan for AMIS II, which described the transformation of the nature, scope and 
composition of the mission, and called for the enhancement of both the mandate and the 
troop strength of the MILOBs and the protection force. This enhanced AMIS II was 
comprised of 3,320 personnel, including 2,341 military personnel, among them 450 
observers, and up to 815 civilian police personnel, as well as the appropriate civilian 
personnel. AMIS II also received a broadened mandate to include “protecting civilians 
whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within 
resources and capability, it being understood that the protection of the civilian population 
is the responsibility of the government of Sudan” (AU Communiqué).  
Though driven by the general recognition of the need to take primary 
responsibility for responding to crises on the continent, the AU’s actual ability to 
undertake credible and effective operations still remains limited due to a lack of finances, 
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capabilities, and the capacity of the African troop-contributing militaries to conduct long-
term operations. Although there are a number of African states that have considerable UN 
peacekeeping experience (Senegal, Kenya, Botswana, Nigeria, Ghana, and Zimbabwe), 
these countries have only been able to carry out their responsibilities with combat support 
and financial aid from Western countries and the UN. It follows therefore, that the AU’s 
suboptimal performance coupled with the Khartoum government’s obstruction of 
participation by non-African troops in Darfur has served to prevent the deployment of 
forces that could effectively respond to the crisis.  
E. CHADIAN DIMENSION  
The Darfur crisis is intricately tied to Chad’s stability, meaning it cannot be 
looked at in isolation. Any peace effort must take Chad into account; otherwise, there will 
be no meaningful resolution of the Darfur crisis. As is the case throughout Africa, the 
Darfur region is characterized by fluid boundaries, which make for the rapid spillover of 
armed conflicts from one state to another. This is demonstrated by the relatively free 
movement of refugees, small arms, and light weapons across the common border between 
Sudan and Chad. The existence of social and ethnic groups that straddle the border 
creates a network of interests that complicates all interactions in this region. For example, 
the Zaghawa communities living both in Darfur and Chad have been involved in Chad’s 
civil wars, and supported Idris Deby (himself belonging to the Bidemat, a sub-group of 
the Zaghawa) in his bid to seize power in Chad.  
Darfur has long hosted immigrants from West Africa who have settled in Sudan 
relatively peacefully. The emigration of Chadians into Darfur, however, has been 
problematic because of their association with armed groups who are keen on seizing 
power in Chad and use Darfur as a rear base from which to launch their attacks. This has 
had significant negative consequences in Darfur as they serve to not only alter the 
demographics of the region, but spread small arms, thereby increasing the rate of crime 
and violence in the region. 
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Control of the common border with Chad remains an elusive factor, worsened by 
the proxy war between the governments of Chad and Sudan. Numerous armed opposition 
groups challenging the Deby’s regime have been reported to receive direct support from 
Khartoum and operate in Darfur, while members of Chad’s ruling circles are giving 
logistical support and material to SLA and JEM in retaliation (International Crisis Group, 
20 June 2006, p. 6). This goes on despite the February 8, 2006 Tripoli agreement reached 
by the two governments to stop supporting each other’s rebels, and work together to end 
the cross border conflict. 
F. LIBYA 
Constantly striving to maintain Libya’s regional influence and international 
relevance, Muamar Gaddafi has engaged in territorial disputes and meddled in regional 
politics since seizing power in Libyan in a coup d’état in 1969. Libyan meddling in the 
region has had far-reaching effects, especially during the 1970s and 1980s when Gadaffi 
supported Chadian rebels operating from military bases in Darfur. Libya’s interest in 
annexing the Aouzzou region in northern Chad involved Darfur because of its proximity 
and strategic location. Because of the cold war strategies of both the former USSR and 
US, arms and military hardware were sent to Chad and Darfur in huge quantities 
(Mamdani, 2009, pp. 212–217). This served to inflame and increase armed robberies and 
tribal conflicts.  
Gaddaffi’s bid for influence in the Sahel region led to the rise of what we might 
call the Arab supremacy by encouraging the Arabization among the tribes in Darfur, 
many of whom today provide the foot soldiers for the Janjaweed (Rolandsen, 2007, p. 
155). This had a clear impact in the 1987–1989 Arab-Fur war with devastating 
consequences for the population, and the polarization of Darfur between those identifying 
themselves as Arab or African. 
Similarly, the tension between Sudan and Chad, with each accusing the other of 
supporting the other’s rebels, has seen Libya side with Chad against its regional rival, 
Sudan. To remain relevant and influence events in Darfur and Chad, Libya currently 
provides support to JEM and some factions of the SLA—for instance, SLA-Unity led by 
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Ousman Bushara and Abdallah Yahya (Enough, 2009, July 27). Ironically, Gaddaffi also 
considers himself, a regional peacemaker. Libya has presided over multiple negotiations 
between Chad and Sudan, and was most recently the facilitator at the 2006 AU talks that 
led to the signing of the DPA. He subsequently hosted the Darfur peace talks in 2007 at 
Sirte in Libya. Worth also keeping in mind is Gaddafi’s current chairmanship of the AU 
and his involvement in peace efforts in the region are driven by pursuit of grander 
international ambitions that include the establishment of a “United States of Africa” with 
himself at the center.  
G. EGYPT 
Egypt has twice had legal sovereignty over Sudan first during the Turco-Egyptian 
control from 1820–1885, and secondly under the Anglo-Egyptian condominium, making 
it one of Sudan’s most important neighbor, and still consider Sudan it backyard. Egypt’s 
concern with its neighbor’s affairs is tied to the perceived potential negative effects the 
fragmentation of Sudan will have on Egypt’s national security. Egypt’s Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Abu Gheit, was quoted on Al Jazeera saying that the Darfur crisis 
threatens Egypt’s national security (ICG Report, 26 November, 2007 p. 20). Egypt is 
particularly concerned about preserving access to its share of the Nile. The government in 
Cairo thus supports the NCP in exchange for protecting Egypt’s water interests. The Nile 
agreement, signed by Egypt and Britain in 1929 binds eight other upstream nations 
(Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, and D R Congo), but the 
terms of the agreement are quite dated (FAO, The Nile Water Agreement). Preserving the 
agreement among nine countries is hard enough, but especially with increased demand 
for water because of population growth and climatic conditions ravaging this region. In 
its own interests, Egypt will go to any length to ensure that Sudan remains one country. 
Similarly, Egypt’s concern about the disintegration of its southern neighbor is to prevent 
the possibility of the emergence of a hostile regime in Khartoum or one with a radical 
Islamic agenda. 
Egypt has opposed sanctions against Sudan and attributes most of the violence in 
Darfur to the rebel non-signatories to the DPA. Though an active participant in the Darfur 
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peace process—Egypt has provided troops to AMIS and continues to push the NCP and 
rebels to enter into negotiations—its motives remain suspect in the eyes of the rebel 
movements, as it is viewed as being too close to Khartoum (International Crisis Group, p. 
20). While an important stakeholder, Egypt remains a potential spoiler for any agreement 
which it believes threatens its interests.  
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IV. WHAT CAN BE DONE: A GRASSROOTS RECONCILIATION 
APPROACH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Reconciliation is a process that enables previously warring groups to come 
together and find room for mutual accommodation. Ideally, reconciliation should involve 
not only political and military players at the national level, but society as a whole. Since 
conflicts have existed as long as man, societies have developed ways and mechanisms for 
dealing with internal conflicts at the local or grassroots level, such as interpersonal or 
conflicts between families, or clans.  
After the end of apartheid in South Africa, the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) was established to prevent acts of revenge and bloodshed as white 
minority rule gave way to black majority rule. The TRC drew heavily on the Bantu 
traditions that resonated with people seeking justice in a way that would still maintain 
national cohesion.  In post genocide Rwanda, Gacaca courts were established for similar 
reasons. Sudan likewise has such traditional conflict management mechanisms that were 
previously quite effective and enjoyed wide support until the 1970s when the native 
administration was systematically weakened. Unlike contemporary conflict resolution 
mechanisms, traditional mechanisms rely on the power and authority of the elders of a 
community who are respected by all. In this chapter, we consider how conflict resolution 
mechanisms might be better harnessed as an instrument for helping to settle the ongoing 
conflict in Darfur.  
Given that the Darfur conflict has been raging for the last six years, the question 
we need to ask now is: Is there any solution to this crisis in sight? As we have seen, the 
dynamics of the conflict have local, national, and international dimensions. If the 
problem is to be solved, especially at the local level, then the solution has to include 
altering the local parameters driving the conflict. This section explores ways of 
facilitating a reconciliation process based on the traditional structures used by the people 
of Darfur.  
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Externally driven peace initiatives have their merits, but also come with 
limitations as to how much can be achieved for a long-lasting and permanent peace. 
Examining the history of Sudan, which has been in conflict with itself for forty out of its 
fifty years of independence, it seems important to take into consideration the unique 
character of African culture in general, and Sudanese culture more specifically. Worth 
examining are the traditional grassroots mechanisms, such as those applied in the 1980s 
to resolve communal conflicts in Darfur. Also worth considering, are state driven conflict 
resolution models that involved external mediators, as used in the Addis Ababa 
Agreement in 1972, CPA, and in the DPA (Mamdani, 2009, p. 288). Lessons too can be 
drawn from other reconciliation processes undertaken in South Africa, Sierra Leone, 
Mozambique, and Rwanda. All four of these recognized the importance of a culturally 
based system designed to achieve lasting reconciliation. 
The need for a justice and reconciliation system is highlighted by lessons learned 
from the CPA which adopted a “blanket forgive and forget amnesty” for those 
responsible for crimes committed during the North-South civil war. Magdi Algazouli, a 
Sudanese lawyer, maintains that the “failure to probe into the atrocities committed in 
[the] GoS-SPLM war encouraged a repeat of the same crimes in Darfur and a blanket 
amnesty in the Darfur war is simply untenable” (Algazouli, 2009). 
B. KEY ISSUES VOICED BY DARFURIANS 
 As noted previously, the mediation process that culminated in the failed DPA 
involved only the Khartoum government and the main rebel groups. Conspicuously 
absent were the voices of the Darfurians, especially the IDPs, refugees, and women. At 
the end of the negotiation only the GoS and one rebel group, SLA/MM, signed the 
agreement; the other rebel groups refused to sign and have been accused of being 
responsible for the spike in violence immediately following the DPA. Omer Ismail, John 
Prendergast of Enough project, and Jerry Fowler (2008) of the Save Darfur Coalition in 
their memorandum congratulating the Djibril Bassole on his appointment as UN/AU joint 
mediator for Darfur highlighted the following key themes raised by the Darfur population 
for the mediation process to address:  
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 The need to share power and wealth more equitably in order to end 
historic marginalization, including direct efforts to increase representation 
of traditionally marginalized groups in government 
 The need to decentralize political and fiscal decisions 
 The need for victims of violence to receive adequate and individual 
compensation and restitution for stolen or destroyed property 
 The need for those driven from their homes to be able to return to their 
lands safely and in dignity, with the establishment of practical land 
ownership and rights policies that will encourage such return 
 The need to dismantle the structures of violence—particularly the 
Janjaweed militias—that continue to tear Darfur apart 
 The need to establish practical mechanism for promoting reconstruction 
that will include local representation, the government, and the 
international community (Ismail, Prendergast, and Fowler, 2008).  
To properly and adequately address these complex issues, on which the 
government and the rebels hold quiet differing positions, requires a process that 
will bridge these disparities and involve a much broader array of stakeholders, 
particularly the civilian victim languishing in IDP or refugee camps  
C. DEALING WITH DARFUR WAR CRIMES 
The question of whether peace in Darfur is imminent or not is open to debate, but 
one thing that is certain is that the sustainability of peace and the guarantee of 
harmonious post-conflict co-existence require the careful handling of potential war 
crimes. The reactions so far seen or witnessed following the International Criminal 
Court’s (ICC) indictment of President Omar al-Bashir—the expulsion of 16 humanitarian 
organizations; the divisions the ruling has caused between those who support versus 
oppose the decision, especially within Sudan itself; and the AU and Arab League 
countries’ lack of support—proves the need for a careful re-examination of how the 
Darfur war crimes issue should be approached. The mixed and contentious reaction to Al-
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Bashir’s indictment has put more than a million of IDPs who depend on humanitarian aid 
at risk of starvation; it has emboldened the Darfur rebels, thereby reducing the prospects 
for any genuine engagement with the government; and it has simultaneously unraveled 
the CPA that ended the North-South civil war (ICG, 2009). The fact that China, the AU, 
the Arab League and the Islamic Conference have publicly rallied behind Khartoum, 
criticizing the ICC for endangering ongoing peace initiatives and the security of the 
peacekeepers has made the prospects for reconciliation even more difficult. 
In Darfur, there is little consensus regarding the number of fatalities, the incidence 
of rape, or the extent of property destroyed (Mamdani, 2009, p. 25–38). However, there is 
a general agreement that the atrocities committed involve numbers that border on ethnic 
cleansing and exceed the capacity of the formal systems to handle. To facilitate a quick 
return of the 2.7 million IDPs to their homes requires a system that will guarantee them 
justice while fostering reconciliation.   
When dealing with cases of mass atrocities committed during an ongoing or 
recently ended conflict, the question of justice and peace becomes a critical factor in the 
peace process.  In the case of Rwanda after the 1994 genocide, the judicial response was 
to adopt a three-tier court system to address the different levels of crimes committed. At 
the top were those seen as bearing the greatest responsibility for the genocide and were 
tried under the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Second were the 
middle level perpetrators, tried through the national judicial system. Finally were the 
local level perpetrators who went through the traditional Gacaca courts, revived and 
modified to suit 21st century realities (Graybill, 2004). 
Critical to South Africa’s TRC was, Bishop Desmond Tutu’s belief that former 
enemies could be reintegrated into the community based on his understanding of the 
African philosophy of umbuntu. Umbuntu derives from the Xhosa expression “Umuntu 
ngumuntu ngambanye bantu,” which translates to “people are people through other 
people” (Graybill, 2004, p. 3). African traditional thought emphasizes the importance of 
re-integrating evildoers into the community rather than punishing them; re-integration 
forms the basis for forgiveness. According to Tutu’s conception of umbuntu, “I am 
human because you are human, if I undermine your humanity, I dehumanize myself.” In 
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South Africa, the reason for choosing restorative justice and the granting of amnesty was 
to encourage the National Party to follow through on its promise of transition to 
democracy. Without the promise of immunity from prosecution, the white government 
would not have easily relinquished power. Ironically, this is the same logic the AU and 
the Arab League apply to oppose the issuance of an arrest warrant for Al-Bashir, 
claiming it would undermine the ongoing peace process.   
D. RWANDA’S GACACA SYSTEM 
Following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the international community called for 
accountability and an end to impunity, which led to the formation of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Because of perceived shortcomings of the ICTR 
the government of Rwanda revived the traditional system for dispute resolution, Gacaca. 
Gacaca represents a model of restorative justice because it focuses on the healing of 
victims and perpetrators through confessions, plea bargains, and reintegration 
(Tiemessen, 2004, p. 58). This radically differs from the ICTR whose focus is retributive 
and punitive in nature.  
There are significant differences between the Rwandan and Darfur crises. First, 
Gacaca came into being through a supportive government after the cessation of conflict. 
But in Darfur the conflict is ongoing and the government is complacent, if not complicit. 
Secondly, the Gacaca system was generally accepted across Rwanda. But in the case of 
Darfur, the traditional legal systems differ from one region to the other, which presents 
clear challenges. Yet at the same time, the local systems in Sudan clearly proved effective 
during and before the colonial period, (as can be seen from the low number of conflicts in 
Table 2).  
The strength of the Gacaca courts lay in their reconciliation function. In a 
traditional trial, there is no winner or loser as the verdict is designed to make everybody 
feel that he is not only gaining, but also losing something. Traditionally, decisions in the 
Gacaca were sealed by all involved taking part in a shared drink of traditional beer 
(Butera, 2005, p. 50). This symbolic gesture symbolized restoration of the communality 
that held society together.  
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The revived Gacaca system was mandated to deal with the mildest, but most 
numerous crimes committed during the genocide. The Rwanda Organic Law, conceived 
in 1996 to facilitate the prosecution of those suspected of having committed acts of 
genocide, categorized the crimes into four types (Tiemessen, 2004, p. 61), as summarized 
in Table 3. Gacaca courts were meant to handle categories 2–4, with the punishments 
varying from life imprisonment to community service and reintegration, but did not 
include the death penalty (Government of Rwanda, 1996, August 30). “Category One” 
suspects, having committed the most serious crimes, were to be tried by the national 
courts. 
Table 3.   Categories of Crimes. 
Category One Planning, organization, instigation, supervision of genocide 
Category Two Physical attacks resulting in death 
Category Three Physical attacks not resulting in death 
Category Four Looting, theft, property damage 
 
Although the Gacaca has been criticized for various shortcomings, it achieved 
impressive results. The key criticisms were from international human rights groups 
regarding the Organic Law’s lack of congruence with international criminal law 
(Amnesty International, 2002).  
As in Rwanda, Darfur had a system of traditional administration and traditional 
law was maintained in part through the native administration, until it was undermined by 
recent Khartoum governments. The question this leads to is, can the successes achieved 
by the Gacaca system in Rwanda be replicated in Darfur?  Abdullahi Osman El-Tom 
(2009) suggests that the Berti tribe’s system of mediation via a traditional council offers 
one model that could be adopted in Darfur. Clearly minor variations exist from one tribe 
to another, and so these would have to be harmonized so as to provide a uniform model. 
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E. DARFUR’S LEGAL SYSTEM OF TRADITIONAL ADMINISTRATION 
In Chapter II, we discussed how the systems that had previously managed 
conflicts in Darfur were systematically emasculated, with no effective alternative 
introduced for maintaining law and order. As a consequence, and as we see in Table 2, 
this gave rise to exponential growth in the number of local disputes, especially after 1970.  
As elsewhere in Africa, in Darfur most of the population remains rural, depending 
for subsistence on farming crops and/or raising livestock. The reach of government is so 
limited that most of the interactions and day-to-day activities in most communities are 
guided and controlled by traditional structures. Nowhere is the reach of government more 
limited than in Darfur, which suffers from poor infrastructure, further limiting the level of 
contact and interaction between communities, let alone with the government.  
Traditionally in Darfur, the native administration consists of three administrative 
tiers (Abdul-Jalil, Mohammed, and Yousuf, 2007, p. 46). Heading the uppermost tier is 
the paramount chief (referred to in other tribal communities as the Nazir or Malik), who 
is in charge of the entire tribe.   Next is the omda who is the head of a tribal subsection. 
At the lowest level are the sheikhs, who are the village or clan heads. It is worth noting 
that a chain of command exists among these tiers, with the sheikhs being responsible to 
the omdas who are in turn responsible to the paramount chief. All of these native 
administrators were granted legal powers to maintain law and order and collect taxes in 
their respective communities. The system was very efficient for maintaining law and 
order as information travelled up the chain quickly.  
As we have seen, the signing of the DPA deferred crucial issues such as land 
ownership and adjudication of property rights, inter-communal reconciliation, the safe 
return of IDPs and refugees, delineation of traditional grazing routes, and re-
establishment of amicable relations between pastoral and farming communities. The idea 
was these issues would be dealt with through the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and 
Consultation forum to achieve buy-in for the wider population of Darfurians. In a most 
paradoxical way, this underscores the trust that the people seem willing to place in the 
potential of the traditional structures for helping to resolve conflict.  
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F. JUDIYYA 
In Darfur, customary mediation is known as judiyya. The judiyya is based on 
third-party mediation, with the mediators known as ajaweed. Traditionally, these were 
elderly people who were well versed in communal and customary laws (Bradbury et.al, 
2006, p. 88). The judiyya is a form of open conflict resolution conference (mutamarat al 
sulh) whose decisions once made, were respected by all. This system of conflict 
resolution is likely to resonate with Darfurians as generations of intermarriage and 
coexistence among ethnic groups have led to a common regional understanding about 
judiyya. Like Gacaca, it is a traditional system that evolved for tackling day-to-day 
disputes involving issues like land rights and boundary disputes.  
There are two types of judiyya, which can be distinguished based on the 
convening body or authority: communally sponsored judiyya and government-sponsored 
judiyya (Bradbury et.al, 2006, p. 88). The latter had its origins in the Anglo-Egyptian 
Condominium period, with the first government-sponsored judiyya taking place in 1932.  
During the colonial period (1916–1956), the native administrators (tribal leaders) 
formed the body of ajaweed or mediators when conflicts involved multiple groups or 
tribes. When a conflict involved more than one tribe, the government-sponsored judiyya 
was convened with tribal leaders who were not party to the conflict constituting the 
mediation party (Mohamed, 2002). Since the systematic weakening, of this systems 
through constant interference, and manipulation of the ethnic divisions by the central 
government, have substantially undermined the sanctity or value of government-
sponsored judiyya.   
The customary mediation or judiyya still enjoys a level of acceptability, especially 
at the local level where society remains tradition-bound. However, this too is not 





 Takes into consideration local structures and understanding 
 Quick to institute as it calls for the involvement of those who command 
respect within the community in question. 
 Provides for reconciliation and forgiveness as opposed to punitive 
judgments as in western form of justice). As one participant is quoted as 
saying: 
The court will postpone the problem, the [judiyya] will solve it.” As this 
individual goes on to note, “The court will declare one of the disputants 
victorious; the other will feel being the loser and will never forgive the 
victor. The [judiyya] on the other hand, makes both disputants satisfied 
with the decision, thus pre-empting future tense relations. (Mohamed, 
2002) 
 Ensures local ownership, which correlates with local legitimacy that 
would otherwise be missing from an externally driven method of justice 
and reconciliation.  
2. Disadvantage 
 Lack of a set standard, as it relies on the competencies of the appointed 
ajaweed, which is difficult to measure. 
Having discussed the native or tribal administration’s role in conflict resolution, the 
question that remains is, how can this system be harnessed to address the problems of 
Darfur? As discussed earlier, the systematic evolution of the native administration has 
seen more emphasis placed on its administrative aspects—to include political 
mobilization—than its previous judicial role of maintenance of law and order (Abdul-
Jalil, Mohammed, and Yousuf, 2007, p. 50). The tribal structures are capable of 
generating an acceptable solution but only if backed by an unbiased administration. For 
instance, disputes over land, communal grazing, water, and animal routes can be handled 
amicably through the judiyya system, ideally resolving them before they got out of hand 
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and become violent and require formal government attention. But the government has to 
be willing to support these local initiatives without interfering.  
Looking at Darfur today, the same factors or constraints that led the British to retain 
and support an administrative system based on tribal affiliation (indirect rule) still 
remain: Darfur is a vast and remote area, and the central government lacks the resources 
to effectively extend its authority to the remote and/or highly mobile communities.  
The moral status and customary skills of elders remain a vital component in tackling 
many of the problems in rural African societies. The traditional structures on their own 
are not a complete panacea for the problems in Darfur, but should be combined with 
development assistance so the people can regain their means of livelihood. Additionally, 
as traditional systems are restructured to deal with the local level disputes, there is a need 
for internal reforms in Sudan so that the marginalized regions can be made part and 
parcel of the country. Sudan’s history has been bedeviled by struggles between the North 
and South, Arabs and Africans, Christians and Muslims.  It is only through the 
implementations of genuine reforms that such dichotomies can be addressed, to arrive at 
a Sudan that is at peace and in harmony with itself.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS  
This thesis has argued that conflict in Darfur is not a new phenomenon, but the 
scale was managed at the communal level by use of time-tested traditional mechanisms. 
These mechanisms were based on solid traditional institutions such as mediation through 
a council of elders (ajaweed). The current conflict, which began as a civil war in the 
1980s over access to scarce resource (land and water), was exacerbated by other factors 
ranging from: environmental degradation, population growth, spillover of conflicts in the 
neighboring country of Chad, and the geopolitical maneuvering of regional actors such as  
Libya and Egypt. While Darfur’s multiple ethnic groups existed in relative peace 
previously, the policies adopted by successive Khartoum regimes have served to polarize 
the population into “Arab” and “African” groups that further worsened the competition 
over scarce resources.  
Beginning in the 1970s, the systematic and deliberate erosion of the native form 
of administration which was responsible for maintaining law and order and resolving 
conflicts meant that communal feuds escalated, thereby leading to the current situation. In 
the context of greater access to sophisticated weapons (AK47s, G3s and RPGs), conflicts 
intensified into the bloody and brutal war we see today. Thanks to the globalized nature 
of society, politicization of the native administration, and the introduction of the gun 
culture, the powers of elders have been reduced. The supply and availability of cheap 
small arms has changed power relations in the Darfur, with the emergence of new centers 
of power as youth gain access to arms and use them for criminal activity.  
In addition, with the population trapped in IDP camps with the accompanying loss 
of property, elders have lost their autonomy and status in society. Traditionally, headmen 
in African settings drew their power from their status in society. But, disrupted by 
conflict, this authority has been severely eroded reducing elders effectiveness as 
mediators of conflict. Furthermore, with the politicization of the local administrative 
system by operators at the center, there is confusion about the role of elders in relation to 
elected or appointed local government officials whose agenda is to do the bidding of the 
central government, disregarding the local populace.  
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While the ultimate goal should be to resolve the structural issues that underlie the 
conflict in Darfur and develop the region so as to ensure that power and wealth are 
shared, in the interim there is an urgent need to strengthen traditional resources for 
conflict resolution because they still retain substantial resonance among many members 
of displaced local populations. In view of the fact that in the greater part of Darfur, the 
state has a relatively weak presence, if it is not totally absent, traditional mechanisms for 
conflict resolution are certainly better placed to provide an ideal alternative that takes into 
consideration community values and promotes rehabilitation of errant elements back into 
the community. 
For judiyya to be effective, however, the relations between central government, 
local authority, and indigenous leadership need to be clearly articulated. Similarly, there 
is a need to have a clear definition of what dar (tribal land) and ownership (hawakir) 
entails. That is, do these traditional concepts refer to ethnic homelands or administrative 
units? What rights do minority groups within the dar have versus those of the majority? 
The DPA, failed to articulate this well, but only states in Paragraph 158 that “they shall 
be recognized” (Sudan Tribune), and refers the matter to a State Land Commission. 
Again, the implication is that traditional and customary laws have a role in addressing 
local disputes. This realization alone is a step in the right direction. Without advocating a 
total reversal to pre-1970s traditional administrative structures, it is worth building on 
what Sudanese themselves recognize are helpful. The challenge lies in strengthening 
them from the center without subverting them or using them for local or supra-local 
political gain. 
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